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GOVERNING AND FINANCING BLENDED ENTERPRISE
DANA BRAKMAN REISER*
The image of nonprofit and for-profit as dual and exclusive categories
is misleadingly simple. This blurring of the boundary between for-profit
and nonprofit has gone on for years and appears only to be gaining steam.
Yet, traditionally, the law has put organizations to a choice of either the
nonprofit or for-profit form of governance. In the first decade of this cen-
tury, organizational law is beginning to catch up with the boundary-
blurring trend. Legislatures are creating new forms for blended enterprise,
including several U.S. states' low-profit limited liability company (the
"L3C") and the community interest company (the "CIC") in England and
Wales. Along with these more formal efforts, at least one self-regulatory
scheme provides a framework to fashion a blended form (the "B Corpora-
tion") under traditional state for-profit corporation law. This article will
describe and compare these forms and evaluate whether they can enhance
the governance and finance of blended enterprise.
Part I will detail these three new hybrid forms of organization. Each
hybrid form draws on features found in existing organizational frame-
works, adding on organizational innovations. In addition, to understand
how hybrid forms seek to house truly blended enterprises, one must appre-
ciate their tax treatment, governance structures, and financing strategies.
With the qualities of these three hybrid forms fully explained, Part II offers
a comparison and critique. In order to articulate the benefits hybrid forms
attempt to secure, this Part will first explore how hybrid forms differ from
traditional nonprofit or for-profit forms of organization. This exploration
isolates two goals for hybrid forms; they must expand the financing avail-
able to blended enterprises and also offer credible commitments to enforce
such enterprises' dual missions. Finally, this Part will compare how each of
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the hybrid forms accomplishes these important goals. Part III concludes
with the unsettling finding that these vital goals often appear to trade off
against each other.
I. NEW HYBRID FORMS OF ORGANIZATION
Hybrid forms vary widely in their provenance and characteristics.
Legislation here and abroad has spawned some of them; others are crea-
tures of self-regulation. Although they are certainly novel, none of these
hybrid forms have invented their features entirely of whole cloth. Rather,
the creators of each form selected an existing form of organization as a core
framework and then engrafted special hybrid features onto that basic form.
These borrowed frameworks run the gamut. This Part describes the compo-
nents of three quite different, currently available hybrid forms: the L3C, the
CIC, and the B corporation. In doing so, it focuses particularly on how the
forms variously address governance, financing, and taxation to create a
blended nonprofit/for-profit form.
A. Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies
Vermont was the first U.S. state to permit entities to form as low-
profit limited liability companies, adopting legislation creating the form in
April 2008.' Since then, Michigan, Utah, Wyoming, the Crow and Oglala
nations, and Illinois have followed Vermont's lead, enacting L3C legisla-
tion of their own.2 North Dakota and Maine have committed by legislation
to studying this new form. 3 Individuals and lawmakers in yet other states
are engaged in more informal discussions about the L3C option.4 As enti-
ties can form in any state to do business throughout the United States, the
L3C has quickly become a widely available choice of form. As a form of
organization only in its infancy, much remains to be learned about how it
1. Americans for Community Development, L3C Legislative Watch,
http://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/legislativewatch.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2010)
[hereinafter L3C Legislative Watch]; Vermont Secretary of State, Starting an LLC: Low-Profit Limited
Liability Company, http://www.sec.state.vt.us/corps/dobiz/llc/llc_13c.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2010).
2. See Ann Meyer, Firms With Social Bent See Payoff In New Law, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 10, 2009, at
19 (noting Illinois' enactment of L3C legislation); Nicole Wallace, Tough Economy Offers New Oppor-
tunities for Charity-Run Businesses, CHRONICLE OF PHILANTHROPY, May 7, 2009, at 33 (describing
Michigan, Wyoming, Utah, and the Crow nation's adoption of legislation recognizing the L3C); L3C
Legislative Watch, supra note I.
3. See North Dakota H.B. 1545, 61st Leg. Assem. (N.D. 2009), available at
http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/61-2009/bill-text/JBQGO100.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2010); Maine
H. Paper 884, 124th Leg., 1 st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2009), available at
http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/bills_124th/billtexts/HP088401.asp (last visited Mar. 8,
2010).
4. Id.
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will function in practice. This subpart uses the existing L3C law and some
other materials produced by the form's promoters to (1) outline its basic
approach to issues of taxation and (2) to discuss one option for L3C gov-
ernance and financing.
The L3C takes the limited liability company form as its base, retains
much of the LLC's inherently flexible nature, and adds features that hy-
bridize nonprofit and for-profit elements.5 Each adopting jurisdiction has
thus far followed a similar pattern, which engrafts the L3C option onto an
existing LLC statute.6 The L3C enactments add language defining an L3C
as organized for business purposes and operated to satisfy four core re-
quirements. 7 An L3C must "significantly further the accomplishment of
one or more charitable or educational purposes" under the federal tax
code. 8 The enabling legislation typically also issues a kind of negative
command, requiring that a company "would not have been formed but for
the company's relationship to the accomplishment of' those purposes.9
Next, the statutes require that neither income production nor property ap-
preciation may be a significant purpose of an L3C, and some require this to
be stated in the L3C's formative documents. 10 Yet the enactments generally
clarify that producing "significant income or capital appreciation shall not,
in the absence of other factors, be conclusive evidence" of such a prohib-
ited purpose."I Finally, each statute specifically disallows L3Cs from pur-
suing purposes that would disqualify an entity from exemption under I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3)'s limitations on lobbying and political campaign activity. 12
5. See, e.g., Vermont Secretary of State, Starting an LLC: Low-Profit Limited Liability Com-
pany, http://www.sec.state.vt.us/corps/dobiz/llc/llc-]3c.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2010).
6. Illinois, Michigan, Utah, and Wyoming have all amended their Limited Liability Company
Acts. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/1-26 (2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.4102 (2009); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 48-2c-412 (2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-102(a)(ix) (2009).
7. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/1-26; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.4102; UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-
412; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27) (2008); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-102(a)(ix).
8. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(A)(i); see also 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/1-26(a); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 450.4102(m)(i); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-412(1)(b)(i); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-
102(a)(ix)(A).
9. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(A)(ii); see also 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/1-26(a); MICH.
CoMP. LAWS § 450.4102(m)(i); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-412(I)(b)(ii); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-
102(a)(ix)(A).
10. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(B); see also 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/1-26(b)(1); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 450.4102(m)(ii); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-412(1)(b)(iii); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-
102(a)(ix)(B).
11. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(B); see also 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/1-26(b)(1); MICH.
COMp. LAWS § 450.4102(m)(ii); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-102(a)(ix)(B); but see also UTAH CODE
ANN. § 48-2c-412(3).
12. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(C); see also 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/1-26(b)(2); MICH.
COMp. LAWS § 450.4102(m)(iii); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-412(1)(b)(iv); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-
102(a)(ix)(C).
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This homogeneity among the various state enactments is, in large part,
due to the genesis of the L3C's contours with its advocates, including the
Mannweiler Foundation, its CEO Robert Lang, and attorney Marcus Owens
(former head of the Internal Revenue Service Exempt Organizations Divi-
sion). Along with other contributors, these advocates devised the basic L3C
model. 13 The model was intended to fit easily onto various states' LLC
bases and provide sufficient limitations so that properly formed L3Cs
would qualify to receive "program related investments" (PRIs) under exist-
ing Internal Revenue Service (IRS) rules. 14
PRIs are investments made by non-profit, tax-exempt private founda-
tions that are entitled to two important forms of special treatment. First,
like grants and most operating expenditures, PRIs qualify toward the re-
quired distribution percentage private foundations must expend for charita-
ble purposes annually. 15 This percentage is determined using a relatively
complex formula, but generally it will fall close to 5% of the fair market
value of a foundation's assets. 16 Second, a PRI is sheltered from designa-
tion as a jeopardizing investment if its primary purpose "is to accomplish
one or more of the [organization's exempt] purposes... and no significant
purpose of [it] is the production of income or the appreciation of prop-
erty."' 17 Jeopardizing investments can subject private foundations to costly
and potentially confiscatory excise taxes. 18
The desire of the L3C's inventors to define the entity to meet the PRI
criteria explains much of the form's content. In order for an investment to
qualify as a PRI, its primary purpose must be "to accomplish one or more
of the purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(B)."' 19 Additionally, no sig-
nificant purpose of a PRI may be "the production of income or the appre-
ciation of property. '20 Other sections of the tax code likewise preclude
private foundations from expenditures for the political purposes forbidden
to L3Cs.2 1 These mandates are reproduced in three of the four core re-
13. Americans for Community Development, The History of the L3C,
http://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/history.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2010).
14. Id.
15. I.R.C. § 4944(c) (West 2009); see also IRS.gov, Program-related investments,
http://www.irs.gov/charities/foundations/article/0,,id=137793,00.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2010).
16. WALTER W. POWELL & RICHARD STEINBERG, THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH
HANDBOOK 283 (2006).
17. I.R.C. § 4944(c) (West 2009).
18. § 4944(a).
19. § 4944(c).
20. Id.
21. §4945.
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quirements for forming as an L3C. 22 The final requirement, that the entity
would not have formed but for its charitable or educational purpose,23 rein-
forces the L3C's position as an entity created to meet the PRI requirements,
helping to signal to private foundations and other investors that it is a pre-
dictable, consistent, and useful type-one that its boosters hope will estab-
lish a brand. 24
The L3C legislation includes virtually no additional content beyond
the four core requirements, 25 relying instead on existing LLC law to ad-
dress any matters not covered by these spare enactments. LLC law is quite
voluminous, covering myriad topics ranging from filing requirements to
investor liability to derivative actions. 26 Certainly, a fulsome exploration of
the subject is beyond the scope of this article. The pivotal issues for the
current inquiry, though, relate to LLC taxation, governance, and financing.
Much has already been said about the L3C's position on issues of
taxation. Its genesis was in large part to create a form for entities that
would receive PRIs, a tax category; language from tax statutes defining that
category provide much of the content of L3C enactments. 27 In addition,
however, the L3C relies heavily on the tax treatment of LLCs to produce its
desired effects. Since 1997, LLCs have been treated as partnerships under
federal income tax law. 28 That is, LLCs (and L3Cs by extension, it is as-
22. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27) (2008); see also 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/1-26 (2009);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.4102(m) (2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-412 (2009); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-15-102(a)(ix) (2009).
23. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(A)(ii); see also 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/1-26(a); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 450.4102(m)(i); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-412(1)(b)(ii); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-
102(a)(ix)(A).
24. See Robert M. Lang Jr., Americans for Community Development Overview,
http://www.americansforconmmunitydevelopment.org/supportingdownloads/ACDOverview.pdf (last
visited Jan. 29, 2010); see also Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on the Social Enterprise
Frontier, 84 TUL. L. REV. 337, 371-76 (2009) (arguing that the L3C form takes major strides in creating
a brand for social enterprise).
25. The enactments do contain some additional definitional language, as well as requirements that
L3Cs label themselves appropriately to alert consumers, associates, employees, and others to their
special status. See, e.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/1-26(b)-(d); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-412(l)(a);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-102(a)(ix).
26. See, e.g., UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT §§ 201-211, 301-303, 1101-1104 (1996); UNIF. LTD.
LIAB. Co. ACT § 201-209, 301-304, 1101-1106 (2006). Please note that the citations throughout this
article are to the Original Uniform Limited Liability Company Act of 1996. There was a revision in
2006, but this will only be cited if there were significant changes to the sections cited.
27. Americans for Community Development, About L3C,
http://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/about.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2010) ("The legis-
lation was specifically written to dovetail with the federal IRS regulations relevant to Program Related
Investments (PRIs) by foundations.").
28. The "check-the-box" regulations issued December 17, 1996 and effective January 1, 1997
permits unincorporated business entities to elect tax treatment as corporations or partnerships. See
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (2009).
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sumed) are treated as pass-through entities.29 The entity itself is not subject
to taxation on its income; rather, profits and losses are allocated to the
members, each of whom must pay tax accordingly to their own tax status.30
According to current IRS guidance, an LLC qualifies for entity-level ex-
emption under § 501(c)(3) only if it is a single-member LLC with an ex-
empt organization as its sole member or a multiple-member LLC in which
all members are themselves exempt entities.31 An L3C would often not,
therefore, itself be eligible for tax-exemption. But, for federal income tax
purposes, pass-through treatment makes the entity-level exemption of pre-
cious little consequence. Because each member is credited profits and
losses and then pays tax or not, depending on its own taxable or tax-exempt
status, 32 the profits a tax-exempt L3C member receives from its member-
ship may avoid federal income tax liability. Whether and to what extent
these profits will avoid federal income tax will depend on the type of ex-
emption the tax-exempt member possesses (e.g., as a public charity or pri-
vate foundation) and whether the profits are taxable as unrelated business
income.
For state property tax exemption, the question of an L3C's entitlement
to entity level exemption has greater salience. An LLC (and an L3C by
extension) can hold property in its own name. 33 Unless the L3C entity
could achieve entity-level exemption, it would be liable for state property
taxes on property so held. In a fully for-profit LLC this might not matter, as
the entity would pay the taxes and then take them as losses. These losses
would then be passed on to the members and would reduce their income
from the LLC accordingly, thereby yielding lower overall income tax bur-
dens for those members. In an L3C hybrid with some exempt and some
taxable members, however, property tax will be payable at the entity level
but will not reduce the exempt entities' income tax burdens when translated
into losses-because these entities are not liable for income tax in the first
place.
29. See 26 U.S.C. § 701 (2009).
30. Id. In fact, it was the desire to achieve pass-through tax treatment that motivated the creation
of the first LLC statute, Wyoming's, in 1977. Kathleen King Parker, The Limited Liability Company:
An Introduction, 39 B. B. J. 8, 8 (1995). Kentucky and Tennessee allow LLCs to form for nonprofit
purposes, but the relevant statutes treat these as just another type of wholly nonprofit entity and do not
contemplate hybridization. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. §§ 275.015, 275.520-275.540 (West 2006); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 48-101-704 (West 2002).
31. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West 2009); Richard A. McCray and Ward L. Thomas, Limited Liabil-
ity Companies As Exempt Organizations Update 30 (2001), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
tege/eotopicbO 1.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2010).
32. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
33. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 112(b)(2) (1996).
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It remains to be seen how state governments will respond to the issue
of property tax exemption for hybrids, including L3Cs. However, existing
law and current trends suggest that it will be a struggle for L3Cs to obtain
property tax exemption. As a type of LLC, states likely will view L3Cs as
for-profit, taxable entities, at least at first glance. L3Cs individually or as a
category may advocate for property tax reductions or exemptions, but their
path will be difficult, as states already are challenging exemptions for tradi-
tional nonprofits engaged in commercial activity, producing large profits,
and competing with for-profits. 34 Additionally, several states employ tests
for exemption eligibility that specifically bar distribution of profits.35
In sum, the L3C offers some tax benefits over a standard for-profit
form. Regardless of its tax-exempt status, the L3C can avoid entity-level
federal income tax liability entirely due to its pass-through treatment. Fur-
ther, tax-exempt members will receive profits distributed to them by the
L3C tax-free. Still, these tax benefits are not on par with those available to
entities formed as nonprofit corporations and charitable trusts. At least
some of an L3C's profits will be taxable-those it distributes to its taxable
members. Additionally, state property taxes, and other types of taxes where
pass-through treatment is not available, will likely apply to L3Cs.
On the topic of governance, the hallmark of LLC law is flexibility.
The LLC form typically provides two alternative sets of default rules for
governance: a member-managed or a manager-managed structure.36 Under
the default rules for a member-managed LLC, the member owners that
form the LLC through contributions manage it directly, much as in a gen-
eral partnership. 37 Operating agreements set up internal governance proc-
esses, including setting thresholds for members' consent to decisions, and
may even set up a managing committee of members or some other execu-
tive structure.38 Most LLC decisions will be made using these structures,
and their terms will govern members' interactions with each other and
members' ability to bind the LLC and fellow members to transactions with
third parties. Still, LLC statutes do stake out certain decisions for which
unanimous consent will be required. 39 These commonly include dissolu-
tion, merger, sale of all assets and other major organic changes to the LLC,
34. See Evelyn Brody, Introduction, in PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES IX (Evelyn
Brody ed., 2002); see also Janne Gallagher, The Legal Structure of Property-Tax Exemption, in
PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES 3 (Evelyn Brody ed., 2002).
35. See, e.g., CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 214(a)(4) (West 2009).
36. See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 101(11)-(12).
37. See § 404(a)(1).
38. See§ 103.
39. See § 404(c).
2010]
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admission of new members, and amendment of the operating agreement. 40
Members in a member-managed LLC also owe fiduciary obligations of
care and loyalty to the LLC and its members, at least to the extent they are
not expressly relieved of management obligations. 41 LLC law will permit,
at least to some degree, fiduciary duties themselves to be altered or re-
moved, though some limit on misconduct will remain as the existence of
the operating agreement imposes on LLC members at least a minimal obli-
gation of good faith and fair dealing.42
Rather than retaining control with members, the default rules for man-
ager-managed LLCs delegate it.43 The manager role somewhat resembles
that of a general partner in a limited partnership, but the LLC manager need
not be a member of the LLC. Statutes vest broad authority to conduct the
LLC's activities in the manager, though again details may be varied sub-
stantially by operating agreement.44 The statutes and operating agreements
also deal with how manager-managed LLCs with multiple managers will
share control. 45 However, members retain some important powers even in a
manager-managed LLC. Members select the manager or managers and
retain authority to remove them, typically through a consent-based proc-
ess.46 Additionally, fiduciary duties bind managers of manager-managed
LLCs, imposing upon them obligations of care and loyalty to the LLC and
its members. 47 Non-manager members typically owe no such duties to the
LLC, as long as they are not in a position to control the manager. 48 Again,
these fiduciary duties may be altered or dissipated by individual operating
agreements. 49
Various finance provisions of LLC law state default rules for buying
into the entity, and receiving distributions from it, while the business is
ongoing and at liquidation.50 Individuals and entities can become member
owners of an LLC in one of two ways. They may make contributions di-
rectly to the entity and thereby receive rights as members through the
LLC's operating agreement (original or amended). 51 These contributions
40. See id.
41. See § 409(a)-(c).
42. See § 103(b)(2)-(4).
43. See§ 301(b)(1).
44. See § 301(b)-(c).
45. See § 404(b).
46. See § 404(b)(3)(i).
47. See § 409(h)(2).
48. See § 409(h)(1), (3).
49. See § 409(h)(4).
50. See §§ 401, 403, 405-407.
51. See§401.
[Vol 85:2
BLENDED ENTERPRISE
are often monetary, but they need not be. 52 Alternatively, an individual or
entity may purchase the membership of an existing LLC member. 53 The
purchase is made from the existing member, and only that member need
receive the relevant consideration. 54 Purchasing this financial interest
alone, however, will not transfer the seller's governance rights to the
buyer.55 In order for the buyer to have rights in governance, the LLC must
admit the buyer to member status, typically through a vote of the member-
ship.56
Under most LLC statutes, default rules do not entitle members to any
distributions during the term of the LLC's operations, though such distribu-
tions may be made in cash. 57 At dissolution, any remaining assets of the
LLC will be paid out to the members, following, of course, superior credi-
tors. 58 Unreturned contributions made to the LLC are repaid first.59 These
are followed by a distribution of all remaining assets in proportions set by
the operating agreement, which need not be equal. 60 As a matter of default,
members may leave the LLC at will, though the operating agreement may
restrain this right, and selling one's share may entail significant financial
costs if the remaining members are reticent to grant admission to new
members.61
As noted above, these governance and financing rules operate as de-
faults, and individual adopters may vary these structures to a significant
degree.62 Most importantly, member owners' rights need not be identical to
each other, and governance rights need not track financial ones.63 An LLC
may bestow governance rights on its members of one kind and not on an-
other, or may weight their participation in various ways and for various
52. See id.
53. See §§ 501(b), 502.
54. See § 501(b).
55. See§ 502.
56. See § 503(a).
57. See §§ 405-406.
58. See § 806.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See § 602(a)-(b). Expulsion is also permitted, with statutes defaulting to a unanimous consent
requirement, but allowing operating agreements to vary this significantly. See § 601(4)-(6).
62. See supra notes 36-61 and accompanying text. To some degree, due to the check-the-box
regulations, the tax classification of an LLC as a pass-through is also only a default rule, and an L3C
could opt for tax treatment as a corporation. However, the benefits of attracting both taxable and tax-
exempt investors would be frustrated by such a decision, and is unlikely to occur.
63. See, e.g., UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 404 cmt.; see also MARK A. SARGENT & WALTER D.
SCHWIDETZKY, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY HANDBOOK § 1.3, at 5 (2009).
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reasons. 64 Likewise, financial contributions need not be equal, nor need
they correspond to governance rights. 65
Advocates of the L3C tout this flexibility as key to the value of this
new hybrid form and have highlighted the L3C's ability to create a
tranched membership structure. 66 An equity tranche of members could be
tax-exempt private foundations making program-related investments. Be-
cause the PRI regulations specifically bar foundations from contemplating
a financial return as a motive for investment, 67 this tranche of members
would be given scant or very remote rights to distributions. A mezzanine
tranche of individuals or entities could purchase L3C memberships as a
type of socially-responsible investment. This tranche of investors would
agree to operating agreement terms that provided them with some access to
distributions, but at a rate lower than market return, presumably doing so in
return for the social or psychic value produced by the entity. The L3C's
operating agreement could then provide for a market-like return to a senior
tranche of individuals and entities seeking such returns, presumably doing
so in competition with other market-rate investment opportunities. The
structure of these provisions might be more debt-like or equity-like (though
if the latter, more like preferred than common stock), providing either a
guaranteed return or a return keyed to the L3C's profits.
Despite their limited or attenuated financial rights, LLC law would
permit an L3C using tranched membership to endow the equity tranche of
tax-exempt entities with significant governance advantages. 68 They could
be granted overwhelming voting power, enhanced rights to vote on matters
of management or policy, powers to select or monitor managers, or other
rights that would vest significant control over the L3C's operations in this
tranche.69 Likewise, LLC law permits a corresponding reduction or exclu-
sion of governance rights in the other tranches. 70 This technique assumes
that governing rights in this tranche of investors without a profit motive or
64. See, e.g., UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 404 cmt.; see also SARGENT & SCHWIDETZKY, supra
note 63, §1,1, at 1-3.
65. See, e.g., UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT §§ 401 cmt., 404 cmt.; see also SARGENT &
SCHWIDETZKY, supra note 63, §§ 1.1 at 1-3, 1.3 at 5.
66. See Lang Jr., supra note 24, at 4; Posting of Jim Witkin to Triple Pundit, The L3C." A More
Creative Capitalism, http://www.triplepundit.com/2009/01/the-13c-a-more-creative-capitalism (Jan. 15,
2009); Robert R. Keatinge, LLCs and Nonprofit Organizations-For-Profits, Nonprofits, and Hybrids,
42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 553, 582 (2009).
67. See I.R.C. § 4944(c) (West 2009).
68. This can be specified in the operating agreement. See, e.g., UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 103;
see also Lang Jr., supra note 24, at 4.
69. See Lang Jr., supra note 24, at 4.
70. See, e.g., UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 103.
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with only a limited one would safeguard the mission of the L3C to pursue
charitable or educational purposes.
Of course, the question of transferability will crucially impact both
governance and financing of L3Cs with tranched memberships. As noted
above, LLC statutes default to placing significant limits on transfer of
membership rights, generally permitting each member to voluntarily and
unilaterally transfer her financial rights to another, but requiring the other
LLC members to approve of the transferee's admission before the trans-
feree will receive any rights in governance. 71 L3C enactments thus far do
not vary this pattern; however, since these are only default positions, oper-
ating agreements may vary them to some extent. If transfer limitations are
left in the LLC default mode, the member interests of those tranches of
investors with governing rights will not have a high degree of transferabil-
ity, which may be the desired effect. These tranches will be locked into the
L3C and will be unable to effectively sell to buyers intent on changing its
mix of social and market goals. In contrast, those tranches of investors
purchasing member interests that do not offer governance rights will see no
additional loss in transferability, as they will not have governance rights to
offer to buyers in the first place.
The extreme flexibility of the L3C form of course allows for varia-
tions beyond tranched membership structures. For example, an L3C might
be used to structure an angel investment fund with a limited membership
admitted only on consent of a gatekeeper foundation. 72 Investors seeking a
social and financial return could, therefore, be screened for a commitment
to blended enterprise. The foundation could be empowered to mandate
redemption of memberships in certain circumstances, making it the sole
arbiter of entry and exit for the L3C's investors. Likewise, the foundation
could be granted dominant governance rights, such as a veto to prevent the
L3C from taking actions that could jeopardize its L3C status or the founda-
tion's program-related investment in it. This type of structure is another
way to deploy the flexible L3C framework to appeal to both foundations
and some broader class of investors.
Ultimately, L3C status appears to be neither a permanent nor a pub-
licly-guarded designation. Such entities might over time veer away from
their charitable or educational purposes for various reasons. If this occurs,
and the L3C no longer pursues primarily social purposes, the statutes pro-
71. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
72. i thank John Tyler for this example, which is similar to the structure described and blessed by
the IRS in a 2006 private letter ruling. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200610020 (Mar. 15, 2006).
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vide that it would simply be converted to a standard LLC. 73 The statutes do
not say how this conversion would take place or who would monitor
whether such a transformation has occurred in the first place. The L3C
form thus boils down to a tremendously flexible financing and governance
regime.
B. Community Interest Companies
Across the Atlantic, the United Kingdom recently initiated a hybrid
form of organization that is now available in England, Wales, Scotland and
Northern Ireland. 74 The form is called a community interest company, or
CIC. 75 The CIC idea was first proposed in a report by the Prime Minister's
Cabinent Office Strategy Unit in 2002, as part of a broader reform agenda
for UK charity law. 76 The report proposed the CIC to "improve access to
finance, create a strong new btand, be legally protected from demutualiza-
tion, and preserve assets and profits solely for social purposes. ' 77 The CIC
was officially created in a 2004 set of amendments to the UK company
law-the analogue to corporate law in the U.S. 78 Although CICs are still
quite new, recent tallies show thousands of organizations have used the
form. 79
The actual content of the CIC enactment is relatively thin, relying on
company law as the basic framework for the new form, though supplying
more details than do the L3C statutes. This enactment delegates continuing
73. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(D) (2008); see also 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/1-26(c)
(2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.4102(m) (2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-412(2) (2009); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 17-15-102(a)(ix) (2009).
74. On July 1, 2005, legislation came into effect providing rules for the creation and operation of
CICs. On July 25, 2005, the Regulator's office was opened to accept applications from organizations in
England, Wales, and Scotland. On April, 6 2007, additional legislation made it possible to form or
convert a CIC in Northern Ireland. THE REGULATOR OF COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANIES,
COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANIES INFORMATION PACK 4 (2009), available at
http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/ClCleaflets/CIC%2 /INFORMATION%2PACK%20VO0.2D.pdf.
75. For a general discussion of the CIC, see generally Debra Morris, Structures at the Seam: The
Architecture of Charities' Commercial Activities Comparative Panel. A View of Other Landscapes
(2008), http://wwwl.law.nyu.edu/ncpl/resources/documents/Conf2008DebraMorris.pdf (last visited
Feb. 22, 2010).
76. CAB3INET OFFICE STRATEGY UNIT, PRIVATE ACTION, PUBLIC BENEFIT: A REVIEW OF
CHARITIES AND THE WIDER NOT-FOR-PROFIT SECTOR 9 (2002), available at
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/cabinetoffice/strategy/assets/strat%20data.pdf (last visited Feb.
22, 2010).
77. Id.
78. QUEEN'S PRINTER OF ACTS OF PARLIAMENT, EXPLANATORY NOTES TO COMPANIES (AUDIT,
INVESTIGATIONS AND COMMUNITY ENTERPRISE) ACT 2004 4 (2004), available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2004/en/ukpgaen_20040027_en-I (last visited Feb. 22, 2010).
79. There are currently 3335 companies registered as CICs. The Regulator of Community Interest
Companies, List of Community Interest Companies,
http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/coSearch/companyList.shtml (last visited Jan. 17, 2010).
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rulemaking and supervision for CICs to a light touch, dedicated CIC Regu-
lator.80 The Regulator has been fairly active, issuing copious guidance ma-
terials for CICs as well as calls for comment on revising them toward
improvement. 81 Like other UK companies, CICs are required to register
their existence and then must apply to the Regulator for their special com-
munity interest status.82 Once authorized, the CIC moniker must be incor-
porated into the entity's name,83 and special features of CIC status will
apply to differentiate the entity from other companies. In reviewing the
CIC's contours, this subpart will again focus on the paramount issues of
taxation, governance, and financing.
In the area of taxation, CIC status does not confer any benefits beyond
those available to other UK companies. 84 CICs are treated as companies for
tax purposes and thus are subject to entity-level tax.85 A CIC may be
formed as a company limited by shares (similar to U.S. for-profit corpora-
tions) or one limited by guarantee (similar to U.S. nonprofit corpora-
tions).86 However, even if formed as a company limited by guarantee, a
CIC is expressly prohibited from being deemed a charity under UK tax
law. 87 Indeed, if a UK charity were to convert to a CIC, it would automati-
cally lose its charity tax status. 88
Charity tax status entitles UK charities to various tax benefits. Chari-
ties are "exempt from tax on most forms of income and capital gains if they
are applied to charitable purposes. '89 They are eligible for "gift aid,"
whereby the UK tax system treats donations to charities as if the donor had
already paid the tax on the relevant amount and allows the charity to re-
claim the amount representing that tax from the government, thereby in-
80. See Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act, 2004, c. 27, § 27
(U.K.); The Regulator of Community Interest Companies, About Us,
http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/aboutUs.shtml (last visited Jan. 17, 2010).
81. See The Regulator of Community Interest Companies, Information and Guidance Notes,
http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/guidance.shtm (last visited Jan. 17, 2010).
82. See Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act § 36.
83. § 33.
84. The Regulator of Community Interest Companies, Information and Guidance Notes § 7.6
(2008), http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/guidance/Chapter/207%20-
%200ctober/o202009%20%20(version%204%20final).pdf.
85. Id.
86. Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act § 26(2).
87. § 26(3)(a).
88. The Regulator of Community Interest Companies, Information and Guidance Notes § 2.4.1
(2009), http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/guidance/Chapter/202%20-
%200ctober/o202009%20(version%203%2OFinal).pdf.
89. HM Revenue & Customs, Detailed Guidance Notes, Annex I-Charitable Tax Exemption,
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/charities/guidance-notes/annexl/annex-i.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2010).
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creasing the value of donations. 90 Further, charities receive an automatic
80% rate reduction on "business rates," which impose property taxes on
UK businesses to be collected and used by local authorities. 91 CICs are
ineligible for exemption from corporation taxes on income or capital gains
and value added tax, and they do not qualify for gift aid.92 Although an
individual CIC may apply to its local authority for business rate relief, any
grant of such relief is entirely discretionary. 93 In sum, tax treatment of a
CIC appears to be quite straightforward, offering no special benefits over
traditional for-profit forms.
As under company law generally, CIC governance is primarily en-
shrined in the board of directors. CICs organized as private companies may
have only one director; other companies must have two or more. 94 All di-
rectors are fiduciaries who must exercise their management and supervi-
sory duties with "reasonable care, skill and diligence" 95 and avoid conflicts
of interest or other situations of potential disloyalty. 96 The goals and re-
sponsibilities of a company versus a CIC director, however, diverge con-
siderably. In a typical company limited by shares, directors should pursue
the interests of the shareholder members in good faith and need only con-
sider other interests such as employees or the environment in their deci-
sion-making. 97 In a CIC or other company with purposes other than solely
to benefit shareholders (such as charities set up as companies limited by
guarantee), these alternative stated purposes are to be the directors' primary
goals. 98
90. HM Revenue & Customs, Gift Aid-an overview, http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/charities/gift-
aid.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2010).
91. HM Revenue & Customs, Charities and tax: the basics,
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/charities/tax/basics.htm#3 (last visited Jan. 17, 2010). Note that charities
appear to get an automatic 80% reduction and other non-profit-making entities may apply for rate
reduction or elimination, so it is possible that a CIC could apply for this. Id. Yet, with the general
position against tax benefits for CICs articulated by the Regulator, receiving such dispensation from
local authorities seems unlikely.
92. The Regulator of Community Interest Companies, Information and Guidance Notes §§ 7.6,
7.6.1, 7.6.3 (2008), http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/guidance/Chapter/207%20-
%200ctober/.202009%20%20(version%204%20final).pdf.
93. § 7.6.2.
94. THE REGULATOR OF COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANIES, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTION 13
(2009), available at http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/ClCleaflets/FAQ%20-
%200ctober%/202009%20V5.00%2OFinal.pdf [hereinafter CIC FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTION].
95. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 174(1) (U.K.).
96. §§ 175-77.
97. § 172.
98. The Regulator of Community Interest Companies, Information and Guidance Notes (2009),
§ 2.3, http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/guidance/Chapter/202%20-
%200ctober%202009%20(version%203%2OFinal).pdf.
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CIC directors are also made responsible for preserving the CIC's abil-
ity to meet the community interest test.99 This test, which must be met in
order to form as a CIC in the first place, requires that "a reasonable person
might consider [the CIC's] activities are being carried on for the benefit of
the community."' 100 The CIC must report its community interest achieve-
ments to the Regulator annually, 101 and in this report, it must "confirm that
access to the benefits it provides will not be confined to an unduly re-
stricted group." 102
UK company law, and by extension CIC law, also provides a role for
members in governance. 103 In a CIC limited by shares, these members will
generally be shareholders; in a CIC limited by guarantee, they will be do-
nors or others admitted to membership by the terms of the CIC's organic
documents.104 While members will not typically manage the company or
oversee its operations on a regular basis, like US shareholders, they retain a
few important rights in company governance, including election and re-
moval of directors, amending the company's organic documents, and ap-
proving major transactions. 105 Moreover, the Regulator asserts that
members have especially important responsibilities in a CIC. 106 As its
Guidance explains:
In all companies, but more so with CICs, members should not regard
delegation to directors as being the same as abdication of responsibility.
It is important that the members should monitor the performance of the
CIC and the directors, for example, to satisfy themselves that the com-
pany continues to meet the community interest test and fully involves the
community in its activities and development. 10 7
99. The Regulator of Community Interest Companies, Information and Guidance Notes § 9.1.2
(2009), http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/guidance/Chapter/209%20-
%200ctober/o202009%20(version%204%2OFinal).pdf.
100. Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act, 2004, 27, § 35(2) (U.K.);
CIC FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTION, supra note 94, at 8.
101. CIC FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTION, supra note 94, at 11.
102. Id. at 8. The criteria are intentionally broader than the public benefit standard that charities
must meet. See Charities Act, 2006, c. 50, §§ 1-5 (U.K.); see also Polly Curtis & Owen Bowcott, Offer
Free Places or Lose Charity Status, Private Schools Told, THE GUARDIAN, July 14, 2009,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2009/jul/14/charity-status-private-schools (reporting on a Charity
Commission audit finding several schools and eldercare facilities that had previously been deemed
charities did not offer sufficient services without fee in order to meet the public benefit test).
103. The Regulator of Community Interest Companies, Information and Guidance Notes §§ 9.1.2,
9.1.3 (2009), http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/guidance/Chapter/209%20-
%200ctober%202009%20(version%204%2OFinal).pdf.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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Furthermore, the Regulator notes that it counts on members to be an impor-
tant source of information revealing concerns about a CIC's activities that
might merit regulatory action.108
Beyond members, the Regulator has also directed CICs to include
other stakeholders in its governance scheme. 109 The specific form of stake-
holder involvement is not mandated, with the idea that CICs of various
types and sizes will flourish using diverse techniques to involve stake-
holders in governance. 10 Yet, the CIC Regulator has offered suggestions
on how stakeholder governance roles might be articulated. " Its Guidance
explains:
The provision of adequate information is clearly the starting point
for the consultation process together with the provision of easily used
methods of feedback.
This can be achieved by simple methods such as circulating news
letters and holding stakeholder meetings or more sophisticated methods
such as setting up a web site with dialogue facilities or issuing formal
consultation documents before taking a major policy decision. Alterna-
tively, stakeholder groups can be given official standing under a com-
pany's constitution (for example, by requiring that they are consulted
before the directors or members make certain types of decisions).
Other stakeholders could be included with the members in the circu-
lation of the company annual report and accounts and invited to attend an
open forum linked to the company's annual general meeting.
In many organisations the setting up of user and advisory groups or
a club committee separate from the board of directors can be an effective
way of bringing stakeholders into the running of the organisation.112
Each CIC can craft individualized stakeholder processes accordingly, but
all CICs must describe their efforts to include stakeholders in governance
in the annual community interest report they submit to the Regulator, and
the Regulator will review it.2 13
The CIC form also entails several important financing aspects. A
CIC's assets are subject to an "asset lock." 114 This asset lock prohibits a
CIC from disposing of assets for consideration of less than their fair market
108. Id.
109. The Regulator of Community Interest Companies, Information and Guidance Notes § 9.2
(2008), http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/guidance/Chapter/209%20-
%200ctober/o202009%20(version%204%2OFinal).pdf.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See CIC FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTION, supra note 94, at 12, 17.
114. The Regulator of Community Interest Companies, Information and Guidance Notes § 6.1
(2009), http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/guidance/Chapter/206%20-%2OFeb%202010.pdf; Companies
(Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act, 2004, c.27, § 30 (U.K.).
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value, except in pursuit of the community benefits the CIC is designed to
pursue or in a transfer to a charity or another CIC.' 15 On dissolution, assets
may not be paid out to directors, members, or equity holders; all assets
must go to another entity whose assets are perpetually devoted to commu-
nity benefit. 116 The Regulator views the asset lock feature of a CIC's finan-
cial structure as its "fundamental feature."'117
In addition to locking assets into community benefit purposes, CICs
are subject to important financial limits relating to dividends. The CIC
statute permits dividends to be paid to members of a CIC limited by shares
only if the Regulator authorizes such dividends by regulations; the statute
also permits the Regulator to place limits on any such dividends. 118 The
CIC Regulator has issued regulations granting such permission, and sub-
jects these dividends to three types of restrictions.' 19 The first limitation
caps dividends per share. For shares issued prior to April 6, 2010, divi-
dends per share may not exceed five percent over the Bank of England base
lending rate, 120 currently set at half a percent. 121 For later issued shares,
"[t]he share dividend cap shall be 20 percent of the paid up valud of a share
in a relevant company."' 122 In addition to the per share caps, the total divi-
dend declared for all shares may not exceed thirty-five percent of distribut-
able profits. 123 Finally, unused dividend capacity may be carried over for
no more than four years. 124
The Regulator set all three caps as part of the initial creation of the
CIC form, but recently issued the change to the per share cap, to be effec-
tive prospectively from April 6, 2010. The change was made in response to
115. §6.1.1.
116. The Regulator of Community Interest Companies, Information and Guidance Notes § 10.5.2
(2007),
http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/guidance/Chapter10%20October/202009%20version%204%20Final.p
df.
117. The Regulator of Community Interest Companies, Information and Guidance Notes § 6.1
(2009), http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/guidance/Chapter%206%20-
%200ctober/o202009%20(version%204%20final).pdf.
118. Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act § 30.
119. CIC FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTION, supra note 94, at 10-11.
120. Id. at 11.
121. Bank of England Home Page, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk (last visited Jan. 17, 2010).
122. THE REGULATOR OF COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANIES, NOTICES UNDER THE COMPANIES
(AUDIT, INVESTIGATIONS AND COMMUNITY ENTERPRISE) ACT 2004 1 (2009), available at
http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/Notices-%20Dividend%20&%201nterest%2Cap%20v01 .pdf.
123. CIC FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTION, supra note 94, at 11.
124. Id. The CIC form also places limits on "performance related interest" in order to ensure such
payments are not structured to avoid the caps applied to dividend payments. The Regulator of Commu-
nity Interest Companies, Information and Guidance Notes § 6.4 (2009),
http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/guidance/Chapter/206%20-
%200ctober/o202009%20(version%204%20final).pdf.
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the Regulator's consultation asking for feedback on how well the various
limits on CIC financing balanced encouragement of investment in CICs
and devotion of these entities to community interests. 125 The Regulator's
summary of responses to that consultation reported significant dissatisfac-
tion with how the dividend caps limited access to capital. 126 In response,
the Regulator issued the revised per share cap, but declined to change the
aggregate cap or carryover provisions. 127
When the dividend restrictions are viewed in conjunction with the as-
set lock, the CIC can be seen as offering investors a significantly altered
form of equity investment. Investors may purchase shares and can partici-
pate in the profits of a CIC limited by shares. Yet, shares entitle investors
only to capped dividends-not the full measure of the CIC's profits it
might be prudent to disburse-and on dissolution, shares do not entitle
their owners to residual earnings.
As compared with the L3C's virtually complete flexibility, CIC gov-
ernance and financing interact in a relatively prescribed fashion. When
equity-type shares are owned, shareholders are members and accordingly
have governance rights to appoint and remove directors, amend the entity's
organic documents, and approve major transactions. 128 These control rights
accompany their financial entitlements, which include the ability to receive
(capped) dividends. 129 However, shareholders are not be the only voice in
CIC governance. The Regulator demands that stakeholders have input as
well, though this involvement may be structured in various ways.130 Thus,
the CIC statute and accompanying regulations impose a fairly rigid struc-
tural sense of how to finance and govern these blended enterprises, and
empower both shareholders and a dedicated external regulator to enforce.
125. THE REGULATOR OF COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANIES, CONSULTATION ON THE DIVIDEND
AND INTEREST CAPS 3 (2009), available at
http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/%27Caps%27%20Consultation%20V00.01 SO.pdf [hereinafter
CONSULTATION ON THE DIVIDEND AND INTEREST CAPS].
126. THE REGULATOR OF COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANIES, SUMMARY OF THE RESPONSES TO
THE CONSULTATION ON THE DIVIDEND AND INTEREST CAPS 5-6 (2009), available at
http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/Summary/20of/ 2OResponses%20V00.01 SO.pdf [hereinafter
SUMMARY OF RESPONSES].
127. See NOTICES UNDER THE COMPANIES (AUDIT, INVESTIGATIONS AND COMMUNITY
ENTERPRISE) ACT 2004, supra note 122, at 1-2.
128. The Regulator of Community Interest Companies, Information and Guidance Notes § 9.1.3
(2009), http://www.cieregulator.gov.uk/guidanee/Chapter/ 209%20-
%200ctober/o202009%20(version%204%20Final).pdf.
129. CIC FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTION, supra note 94, at 10-11.
130. The Regulator of Community Interest Companies, Information and Guidance Notes § 9.2
(2008), http://www.cieregulator.gov.uk/guidance/Chapter/ 209%20-
%200ctober/o202009%20(version%204%2OFinal).pdf.
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C. B Corporations
The final hybrid form to be canvassed here, the B corporation, is self-
imposed and privately regulated, as opposed to the legislatively approved
L3C and CIC forms. A B corporation, also sometimes called a "for-benefit"
corporation, uses the traditional, state-law-governed corporate form as its
base. 131 This base is then varied through statements amending an individual
corporation's organic documents to commit it to "use[] the power of busi-
ness to solve social and environmental problems."' 132 So amended, the crea-
tors of the "B" idea envisioned the entity's documents as self-enforcing. 133
A private, nonprofit organization, B Lab, vets the changes and the com-
pany's structure and operations as part of its certification system. 134 Once
B Lab certifies a company as meeting its requirements, the company may
license the "certified B Corporation" trademark from B Lab. 135
As a private certification system, the B corporation designation offers
no special tax treatment for corporations that obtain it. Ordinary federal and
131. B Lab also offers tools for entities formed as sole proprietorships, limited liability companies,
and general, limited or limited liability partnerships to become certified "for benefit" businesses. How-
ever, as the B corporation brand and most of B Lab's materials appear to default to the corporation form
and to avoid unnecessary complexity and redundancy, this article will concentrate on B corporations.
132. B LAB, INTRODUCING THE B CORPORATION 3 (2009),
http://www.bcorporation.net/resources/bcorp/documents/2009%20B%2OCorplntro-Package.pdf.
133. B Lab, About B Corp, http://www.bcorporation.net/about (last visited Jan. 17, 2010) [herein-
after About B Corp].
134. B certification applicants must submit to B Lab scoring its performance under the B Ratings
System, and must consent to possible audits. See B Lab, How are companies Certified and Audited as B
Corporations?,
http://www.bcorporation.net/index.cfm?fuseaction=modalContent.content&id=f7224b49-ed7f-4037-
894c-31c6e3c32178 (last visited Dec. 29, 2009) [hereinafter How are companies Certified and Audited
as B Corporations?]. This process seeks to ensure that future B corporations will "[m]eet comprehen-
sive and transparent social and environmental performance standards." About B Corp, supra note 133.
It includes a comprehensive self-survey addressing a wide and diverse range of issues. For example, the
survey inquires about the inclusion of social and environmental goals in an applicant's corporate mis-
sion, tax avoidance behavior, board accountability, communication and training for employees, occupa-
tional health and safety, involvement in local communities, water and energy usage, among many other
topics. See, e.g., B LAB, THE B RATINGS SYSTEM: VERSION 1.0 (2008), available at
http://www.bcorporation.netlresources/bcorp/documents/B%20Ratings%20System%20-
%2030+%20Emp%20Mfg.pdf [hereinafter B RATINGS SYSTEM]. Applicants must score eighty out of
200 points or better on their surveys to be eligible to license the "B" mark. See How are companies
Certified and Audited as B Corporations?, supra. In addition, ten percent of certified companies will be
audited each year, based on a random selection process. Id. If any audited company's survey scores
below the required level, it will have ninety days to cure the defects to avoid revocation of certification.
Id. In reviewing this system, however, it must be noted that the entire process is quite new. To date only
the first year's audits have been completed and, in them, all certified entities passed. B Lab, Audits,
http://www.bcorporation.netlindex.cfm/fuseaction/content.page/nodeID/62cOa1 77-6625-4373-9142-
01 e788e468cd (last visited Dec. 29, 2009).
135. B Lab, Become a B Corp-Make It Official,
http://www.bcorporation.net/index.cfn/nodeID/3C192853-ADFD-4CI 0-B5F3-
3D965455 1 A98/fuseaction/content.page (last visited Dec. 29, 2009).
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state income and property taxes will apply regardless of B certification,
though it is possible that this situation may change over time. 136 Commen-
tators are currently debating whether and how tax benefits should be ex-
tended to for-profit companies pursuing social ends. Anup Malani and Eric
Posner argue for uncoupling tax exemption from nonprofit form and its
non-distribution constraint. 137 They further assert that when for-profit enti-
ties engage in activities that benefit the community, they should receive the
same tax benefits and other government subsidization as nonprofit chari-
ties. 138 These claims are roundly criticized by James Hines, Jill Horwitz,
and Austin Nichols, who argue that it is unnecessary and unwise to extend
tax benefits for the community benefit activities undertaken by for-
profits. 139 First off, they explain that any profit losses taxable entities ex-
perience as a result of their community benefit activities already propor-
tionally decrease their tax liability. 140 In addition, they worry that Malani
and Posner's proposal will encourage tax arbitrage' 41 and competition with
traditional nonprofits that will negatively influence them away from their
charitable missions. 142
My own view charts a middle course. I believe charity tax status and
its attendant panoply of tax benefits should not be extended to wholesale
hybrid organizations. 143 These forms differ too significantly from tradi-
tional charities to match well with the incentives these benefits create. Yet,
hybrid forms do offer promise of societal benefit. As we learn more about
how they benefit communities, I believe that distinct, targeted tax incen-
tives to encourage some or all of these forms will be warranted. These is-
sues will no doubt be debated for years to come. Currently, though, "B"
status will not confer any special tax treatment on those who adopt it.
136. See Posting of Thomas A. Kelley Ill to Nonprofit Law Prof Blog, Update on B Corporations,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/nonprofit/2009/09/update-on-b-corporations.htm (Sept. 1, 2009); B
LAB, PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE TO CREATE PRIVATE SECTOR SOCIAL INNOVATION: PRESENTATION TO
THE OBAMA-BIDEN PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION PROJECT 1-2 (2009), available at
http://www.bcorporation.net/resources/bcorp/documents/Obama-Biden--TransitionTeam-Private-
Sector-Social-Innovation-Briefing.pdf.
137. See Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L. REV. 2017,
2064-65 (2007).
138. Id.
139. See James R. Hines, Jill R. Horwitz, & Austin Nichols, The Assault on Nonprofit Status: A
Charitable Assessment, 108 MICH. L. REV (forthcoming May 2010).
140. See id.
141. See id. Victor Fleischer also notes that there would be serious regulatory challenges to be
overcome in order to execute Malani and Posner's proposal. See Victor Fleischer, "For Profit Char-
ity ": Not Quite Ready for Prime Time, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 231, 231-33 (2008).
142. See id., at 22-24.
143. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Charity Law's Essentials 34 (Brooklyn Law Sch. Legal Studies
Research Papers Working Papers Series No. 167, 2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1479572.
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In contrast, B corporations depart significantly from their strictly for-
profit counterparts in terms of governance. Shareholders and directors both
play important roles in B corporation governance, operating in much the
same fashion as in any other for-profit corporation organized under state
law. Shareholders must approve amendments to the corporate charter 144 as
well as other major transactions, including merger, sale of all or substan-
tially all assets, and dissolution. 145 They also compose the body that elects
the board of directors and maintain certain rights to remove or recall direc-
tors from the board. 146 Directors are empowered to manage the corporation
or direct its management by officers and staff.147 In doing so, the directors
are bound by fiduciary obligations, to act with due care, loyalty, and in
good faith. 14 8
The B corporation concept, however, imposes an important gloss on
directors' fiduciary obligations. As noted, to be eligible to license the "B"
mark, corporations must amend their organic documents to include lan-
guage instructing directors to consider interests beyond those of sharehold-
ers in carrying out their duties. 149 More specifically, a New York B
corporation 150 would need to insert the following language into its articles
of incorporation:
In discharging his or her duties, and in determining what is in the best in-
terests of the Company and its shareholders, a Director shall consider
such factors as the Director deems relevant, including, but not limited to,
the long-term prospects and interests of the Company and its sharehold-
ers, and the social, economic, legal, or other effects of any action on the
current and retired employees, the suppliers and customers of the Com-
pany or its subsidiaries, and the communities and society in which the
Company or its subsidiaries operate, (collectively, with the shareholders,
the "Stakeholders"), together with the short-term, as well as long-term,
interests of its shareholders and the effect of the Company's operations
144. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(l)-(b)(2) (2009).
145. See, e.g., §§ 251,253, 271,275.
146. See, e.g., § 141(k).
147. See, e.g., § 141(a).
148. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE §§ 4, 5 Introductory
Notes (1994).
149. About B Corp, supra note 133 (corporations amend their "corporate governing documents to
incorporate the interests of employees, community and the environment").
150. B Lab specifically requires applicants to incorporate in a state with another constituency
statute, and recommends New York, Nevada and Pennsylvania as particularly hospitable. Each has a
relatively broad statute, but Nevada's seems potentially the most sweeping, permitting directors to
consider inter alia the interests of society at large. Compare NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.138(4) (West 2009),
with N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (McKinney 2010), and 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1715 (West
2009).
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(and its subsidiaries' operations) on the environment and the economy of
the state, the region and the nation. 15 1
To give these instructions the best chance of legal enforcement, B Lab
requires applicants to incorporate in a state with an "other constituency"
statute or to reincorporate in such a jurisdiction. 152 "Other constituency"
statutes expressly permit directors to consider constituencies other than
shareholders in directorial decision-making, often particularly contemplat-
ing takeover situations. 153 The quoted language above resonates with New
York's relatively broad constituency statute, which allows directors to con-
sider the interests of employees, retirees, creditors, customers, and the
broader community when they make decisions in the context of changes of
control or otherwise. 154 Yet, under the required charter amendments, a New
York B Corporation director would be obliged to go further, as she would
be commanded to consider these outside interests. 155 Moreover, the range
of outside interests she must consider is even broader than that described
by the statute, including abstract social and environmental concerns. 156
These changes impose unique and seemingly forceful obligations on B
corporation directors. Yet, the charter language and statutes both explicitly
15 1. B Lab, Legal Roadmap, (emphasis added) (to access the quoted information select "C Corpo-
ration" under "Corporate Structure" and "NY" under "State of Incorporation"),
http://survey.bcorporation.net/become/legal2.php (last visited Jan. 3, 2010) [hereinafter Legal Road-
map]
152. B LAB, B CORPORATION LEGAL FRAMEWORK: FOR NON-CONSTITUENCY STATES,
http://survey.bcorporation.net/become/Non-Constituency%2 0State%2OLegal%2OFramework.pdf (last
visited Jan. 3, 2010); see, e.g., Katovich Law Group, Blog Archive: Yes, you can be a B!,
http://katovichlaw.com/2009/07/l 0/yes-you-can-be-a-b/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2010).
153. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.138(4), N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b), 15 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 1715(a).
154. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b). The text of the statute is somewhat more specific and possi-
bly narrower than the suggested language for article amendment. It states:
In taking action, including, without limitation, action which may involve or relate to a change
or potential change in the control of the corporation, a director shall be entitled to consider,
without limitation, (1) both the long-term and the short-term interests of the corporation and
its shareholders and (2) the effects that the corporation's actions may have in the short-term or
in the long-term upon any of the following:
(i) the prospects for potential growth, development, productivity and profitability of the cor-
poration;
(ii) the corporation's current employees;
(iii) the corporation's retired employees and other beneficiaries receiving or entitled to re-
ceive retirement, welfare or similar benefits from or pursuant to any plan sponsored, or
agreement entered into, by the corporation;
(iv) the corporation's customers and creditors; and
(v) the ability of the corporation to provide, as a going concern, goods, services, employment
opportunities and employment benefits and otherwise to contribute to the communities in
which it does business.
Id.
155. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
156. Id.
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decline to create new rights of action in individuals to assert that directors
did not sufficiently consider these non-shareholder interests or constituen-
cies. 157 Nor do they suggest that these interests should or must predominate
serving the interests of shareholders. Perhaps this is merely pragmatism on
the part of the B corporation's creators. It seems likely that courts would
enforce a mandate that directors consider social impact in their deci-
sions, 158 but even strong "other constituency" statutes frequently block
enforcement rights expressly.159
Perhaps shareholders who invest in a B corporation will do so because
of its commitment to social impact, and these shareholders can serve as a
proxy for the non-shareholder constituencies. B corporation shareholders
do elect directors and have a statutory veto on at least some transactions. 160
They could elect only director candidates who promise to heed this mission
and cast aside those who do not; they could reject mergers or other actions
that would imperil it. B corporation shareholders have significant rights to
litigate, though of course they face substantial obstacles in challenging the
directorial action-including the formidable business judgment rule, de-
mand requirements, and other procedural hurdles involved in derivative
litigation. They could attempt to use litigation to enforce the charter re-
quirements explained above, possibly succeeding in requiring due consid-
eration of social and environmental impact in the company's operations.
On the other hand, shareholders might simply purchase for return, come to
the position that return can be maximized by less consideration for society
and the environment, or sell to those who would take such a position.
Which type of shareholders a B corporation attracts, particularly if it is not
closely-held and shareholder identity changes over time, will be far from
certain.
The B Ratings survey does address the question of stakeholder in-
volvement in governance, but does not demand it. In the section on govern-
ance, questions regarding accountability are split into "Board" and "Other"
157. Legal Roadmap, supra note 151 ("Nothing in this Article express or implied, is intended to
create or shall create or grant any right in or for any person or any cause of action by or for any per-
son."); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b) ("Nothing in this paragraph shall create any duties owed by any
director to any person or entity to consider or afford any particular weight to any of the foregoing or
abrogate any duty of the directors, either statutory or recognized by common law or court decisions.").
158. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 2.01 reporter's note
6 ("Because the obligations in § 2.01 run to the shareholders, rather than to third parties or the state,
there is little doubt that such limitations [restrictions on the general profit-making objective] would
normally be permissible if agreed to by all the shareholders. Such an agreement might be embodied in
the certificate of incorporation, or not.").
159. See e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.138(5) (West 2009), N.Y. BuS. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (McKin-
ney 2010), 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1715(d) (West 2009).
160. See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
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categories, which notably receive equivalent weightings. 161 Within the
"Other" category, however, are four questions, two of which ask whether
the company has a policy on whistleblowing and maintains financial con-
trols to enable it to prevent fraud and generate accurate reporting. 162 The
other two ask whether "the company has a forum to directly engage exter-
nal stakeholders on a regular basis" and to "describe how [the] company
engages stakeholders," to which applicants may respond that they offer
annual meetings for stakeholders, fora for them on company websites, sur-
veys of them, other means they may fill in, or that the question does not
apply. 163 The entire section is allocated between 1.6 and 3.3 out of 200
points in the B scale, depending upon whether the company operates in the
manufacturing/wholesale, transportation/distribution or service sectors. 164
Companies must achieve a score of 80 or higher in order to be eligible to
license the "B" mark. 165 Rather than relying upon stakeholders in govern-
ance, the B Ratings rely on their certification and auditing systems to en-
sure B corporations are pursuing and achieving their blended aims. 166 The
B Ratings heavily weight questions about how the applicant integrates its
business and social goals, including relationships with employees, suppli-
ers, local communities, and the environment. 167
Thus, the B corporation form realistically offers only moral, rather
than legal, assurances to non-shareholder constituencies and social inter-
ests. Stakeholders have no structural rights in governance, and no addi-
tional parties are granted standing to litigate. B corporation directors are
empowered to act in the interests of other constituencies; whether they do
so will depend on their own desires or feelings of moral obligation.
Finance, too, tracks the standard for-profit menu. B corporations issue
debt and may utilize equity investors by selling various classes of common
or preferred stock. 168 Dividends are uncapped and shareholders have rights
to acquire any residual assets on dissolution, following the usual order of
priority. 169 B corporation shares may be kept closely-held or may be of-
fered for sale to the wider public. 170 Closely-held shares may be subject to
161. See B RATINGS SYSTEM, supra note 134, at 3, 26.
162. Id. at 3-4
163. Id. at 4.
164. Id. at 26.
165. See Certified B Corporation, Become a B Corporation, http://www.bcorporation.netbecome
(last visited Oct. 3, 2009).
166. See How are companies Certified and Audited as B Corporations?, supra note 134.
167. See B RATINGS SYSTEM, supra note 134, at 27-28.
168. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151 (2009).
169. See, e.g., §§ 170, 281.
170. See, e.g., §§ 151, 342.
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de jure transferability limits under shareholder agreements or de facto ones
due to their closely held nature.171 Publicly-held shares are freely transfer-
able but offer much greater risk of changing the complexion of a B corpo-
ration's shareholding constituency. 172 B corporation founders and leaders
may well desire to keep the corporation closely-held in order to scrutinize
potential shareholders and constrain them by agreement. Even if the financ-
ing capacity of public share ownership becomes attractive, those leaders
committed to the "B" ideals may well adopt additional structures to limit
shareholder power or avert takeovers by a less committed individual or
group. 17
3
The B Corporation thus makes few changes from the traditional cor-
poration, save branding. This branding may, of course, be an important
contribution. 174 It could draw in directors committed to a blended mission
and investors willing to enforce it. It could become something consumers,
employees, and business partners value. The brand also entails a private
regulatory system to help enforce a blended enterprise's dual mission, but it
remains to be seen whether this system will have strong teeth.
II. COMPARISON AND CRITIQUE
To be an effective governance structure, a hybrid form must provide a
mechanism for accomplishing and enforcing the idea of a blended mission:
doing well by (or at least while) doing good. Existing charitable and busi-
ness forms are not ideal structures for entities pursuing blended profit and
social missions. It is this inhospitability, in part, that generates the interest
in crafting new hybrid forms to accommodate such endeavors. For the in-
novations offered by L3Cs, CICs and B corporations to be worth the effort
made to enable and adopt them, they must provide some advantages in
achieving a blended mission over the traditional charitable or business
forms available.
Standard charitable forms are constrained in performing this role in
two important ways. First, nonprofit corporations or charitable trusts are
171. Jimmy G. McLaughlin, The Limited Liability Company: A Prime Choice for Professionals, 45
ALA. L. REV. 231, 242 (1993) ("It is quite common, especially in closely held corporations, for substan-
tial restrictions to be placed on shareholders' rights to transfer their stock interests."); Harwell Wells,
The Rise of the Close Corporation and the Making of Corporation Law, 5 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 263,
275 (2008) ("[C]lose corporation shareholders will seek restrictions on transfer of stock so they can
control who they have to work with.").
172. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 159.
173. Brakman Reiser, supra note 143, at 37.
174. See Kelley, 84 TuL. L. REv. at 361-62, 368-70, 376-77 (noting the importance of branding for
social enterprise, though expressing doubts about the B corporation's viability to create one).
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subject to a legal bar on distributing their profits.175 This non-distribution
constraint is imposed by many sources, including nonprofit corporate,
charitable trust, and federal income tax law.176 The impact of these restric-
tions is clear: a charity's founders and managers may not pursue a profit-
taking strategy beyond provision of reasonable compensation for services
rendered. Second, and relatedly, the unavailability of profit-distribution
likewise places equity financing, and its attendant potential stream of in-
vestment, off-limits to fund traditional nonprofits. They must finance their
operations through some combination of debt, donations, and retained
earned income. Earned income financing strategies are further constrained
by the limitations that federal tax exemption regulation imposes on chari-
ties' commercial activity. These limitations are by no means complete, and
traditionally structured charities may and do engage in substantial commer-
cial activity. The commerciality doctrine and the federal income tax on
charities' unrelated business income will, however, complicate and over-
hang their commercial endeavors. 177
Standard business forms likewise align imperfectly with the goals of
hybrid activity, mainly due to legal and practical problems incident to their
owners' control. The issues arise most starkly in a publicly-held corpora-
tion. Despite occasional exceptions permitting incidental consideration of
other constituencies' interests, for-profit corporate law expects directors to
manage their corporations in order to maximize shareholder wealth. 178
Even where this law is unclear or permits directors some flexibility to con-
sider social objectives, it does not suggest that broader social concerns
should be treated on a par with shareholder interests. Moreover, with or
without a legal imperative, market realities incline directors and managers
of public corporations to pursue profits for shareholders. If directors leave
potential profits unexploited, they run several serious practical risks. They
may be turned out in a future election or, more likely, they may face a sel-
175. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 13.01 (1988); see also Henry B. Hansmann,
The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 (1980) ("A nonprofit organization is, in
essence, an organization that is barred from distributing its net earnings, if any, to individuals who
exercise control over it, such as members, officers, directors, or trustees.").
176. Brakman Reiser, supra note 143, at 7-8.
177. See generally Evelyn Brody, Business Activities of Nonprofit Organizations, in NONPROFITS
& BUSINESS 83-127 (Joseph J. Cordes & C. Eugen Steuerle eds., 2009); MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH,
GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 247-48, 289-95 (2004); John D. Colombo, Reforming
Internal Revenue Code Provisions on Commercial Activity by Charities, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 667,
669-79(2007).
178. See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV.
733, 736 (2005) ("Unless modified by statute, traditional fiduciary duties require corporate managers to
further the interests of shareholders, and thus require them to maximize corporate profits subject to the
obligation to comply with independent legal constraints.").
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loff by irate existing shareholders or a hostile tender offer by outsiders
confident they can make the corporation more profitable if they train their
sights exclusively on profit-generation.
Smaller, closely-held corporations and unincorporated forms offer
somewhat greater room for blended objectives. These forms often indicate
a greater overlap between management and ownership, which can remove
the opportunity for conflict. Even when these categories are not identical,
in a close corporation, shareholder agreements enable founders to exert
significant control over who buys into the corporation, as well as the trans-
fer of ownership shares thereafter. 179 In the partnership and LLC form,
controls over admission and transfer operate as statutory defaults. 180 If
owners come together to pursue a blended mission and can contract to pre-
vent each other from selling out to more single-mindedly profit-oriented
investors, they can protect their vision. Still, the appetites and desires of
owners can shift, and even closely-held and unincorporated business forms
are business forms. If a set of owners come, over time, to favor profits over
social goals, it will be hard to constrain them from voting their preferences.
If enough owners come to this position, their votes can dominate their fel-
lows and change the course of the entity. Thus, neither traditional charita-
ble nor traditional business forms precisely track the needs of blended
enterprise.
The hybrid forms described here have been created to bridge this gap.
Each is essentially defined by an intention to pursue a blended mission. An
L3C is an entity organized for business purposes but operated to further
charitable or educational purposes, without which it would not have been
formed. 181 A CIC is a company "designed in particular for social enter-
prises that want[s] to use [its] profits and assets for the public good."'1 82 A
B corporation "uses the power of business to solve social and environ-
mental problems."'] 83 The forms vary, however, in the means by and extent
to which they offer a structure for financing and enforcing a blended profit
and social mission. This variation may over time create a natural data set
allowing comparison of which form provides the greatest encouragement
for blended enterprises. Such a review would now be considerably prema-
ture. At this early stage, instead, the remainder of this part points to some
179. Wells, supra note 171, at 275.
180. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT §§ 501-502 (1997); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT §§ 501-503 (1996).
181. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(A) (2008).
182. See CIC FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTION, supra note 94, at 4.
183. See About B Corp, supra note 133.
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of the pressure points that seem likely to arise from the varying ways these
forms resolve the questions of financing and enforcing a blended mission.
A. Financing Blended Enterprises
The forms described here all provide blended enterprises with a means
to attract more investment, but each varies the traditional investor role
somewhat differently. 184
Following LLC default rules, the L3C offers members the right to
share in midstream and residual profits, but transferability (and therefore
liquidity) may be quite limited. The default LLC rule permits a member to
transfer her economic interest at will, but governance rights will not follow
this transfer unless the other members (often unanimously) agree to admit
the transferee to membership. This distinction makes the default LLC
membership interest differ importantly from standard common stock. Of
course, these rules are defaults only, and L3C operating agreements can
certainly be tailored to provide more fully transferable membership rights
that are more closely akin to common shares. 185
As an extremely flexible default structure, it is difficult to generalize
about how L3Cs will be financed in practice. The tranched membership
model, however, provides one fully articulated vision of L3C finance that
can be considered, drawing on three different pools of investors. First, the
tranched membership L3C offers the potential for these entities to access
philanthropic funds. As noted, the equity tranche of the L3C is targeted to
secure program-related investments from private foundations. Although, of
course, other donors could also provide funds to L3Cs, the entire L3C pro-
ject has been tailor-made to appeal to the PRI market. Whether this will
unleash dramatic new waves of financing for blended enterprises is again
subject to some important assumptions. First, there are those who argue
that foundations would like to make more PRIs but are frustrated in doing
so by the cost of obtaining advance rulings that particular investments will
184. Investors in all of these hybrid forms would have limited liability; their liability for the enti-
ties' debts is capped at their investment.
185. The simple model operating agreement developed by Americans for Community Development
appears to permit unilateral transfers of the economic interest in an L3C membership subject to a right
of first refusal by current members. If other members do not exercise this right, a transferee may take on
full membership rights by consenting to the operating agreement and admission by the manager. See
L3C OPERATING AGREEMENT 6, 8 (2007), available at
http://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/supportingdownloads/L3COperatingAgreement.p
df; see also LOW-PROFIT LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY OPERATING AGREEMENT, 35, 37 (2008),
available at
http://www.americansforcormmunitydevelopment,org/supportingdownioads/L3C-Prototype-Operating-
Agreement.pdf (similarly creating right of first refusal and admission on vote of governing board).
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so qualify. 186 If the IRS were to issue a blanket ruling that a state-
sanctioned L3C would pre-qualify as a proper PRI, or even provide a safe
list of vetted organizations or a safe harbor for foundations investing in
L3Cs with various qualities, these fears would be significantly eased. If the
IRS does not do so, these potential funds will not be accessed much more
easily by the equity investors in a tranched L3C than they are by current
social enterprises structured as for-profits. The IRS has not yet issued any
such blanket ruling, and some recent comments suggest their possible un-
ease with doing so. 187 Even if the IRS takes the blanket ruling course, there
are also critics who argue that the current law is very open to PRIs and
suggest that the need for a new PRI vehicle is overstated. 188 If these critics
are correct, then even regulator-blessed L3Cs may not find a large and
willing market for their equity tranche memberships.
Additionally, the success of a tranched membership L3C's mezzanine
tranche depends on how large a slice of the investing public will be inter-
ested in a below-market financial return combined with the psychic value
of investing in an entity pursuing a blended mission. In order for L3C mez-
zanine tranche financing to be successful, this untapped market must be
large, and the L3C model must be known to its consumers and provide
them sufficient confidence that a blended mission will be pursued.
Finally, the senior tranche provides a means for attracting market in-
vestors akin to preferred shareholders or debtholders. These types of inves-
tors by definition agree to limited or no access to governance rights, instead
obtaining a safer or greater share of an entity's profits than common share-
holders. Senior tranche L3C memberships are structured on just this
model. 189 A for-profit investor invests, agreeing to abdicate governance
rights to the equity tranche foundations, in exchange for seniority and ac-
186. Michael N. Fine, Kerrin B. Slattery & Keith Staats, Illinois Recognizes New Business Entity
That Mixes For-Profit And Nonprofit Elements, McDERMOTT WILL & EMERY, Aug. 28,2009, available
at http://www.mwe.com/index.cfrn/fuseaction/publications.nldetail/object id/7e32373a-065a4d9l -
a8c2-556532d769a9.cfm ("The only way to be certain of PRI treatment, currently, is for a private
foundation to seek a private ruling from the IRS. However, the private letter ruling process consumes
both time and money.").
187. See Mark Hrywna, The L3C Status: Groups Explore Structure that Limits Liability for Pro-
gram-Related Investing, NONPROFIT TIMES, Sept. 1, 2009, available at
http://www.nptimes.com/09Sep/npt-090901-3.htnml (reporting comments made by Ron Schultz, senior
technical advisor with the IRS's Tax Exempt and Government Entities Division, that "warned against
jumping on the LC3 bandwagon too early because of unresolved tax questions").
188. See, e.g., MARK KRAMER & ANNE STETSON, A BRIEF GUIDE TO THE LAW OF MISSION
INVESTING FOR U.S. FOUNDATIONS, 9-10 (2008), available at http://www.fsg-
impact.org/app/content/ideas/pdf/TheLawandMissionRelatedlnvestingBrief.pdf (last visited Feb. 23,
2010).
189. Ensuring the transferability of these memberships will again be important, in order to access a
traditional bondholder or preferred market.
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cess to market-rate returns. Yet, in a traditional corporate financing struc-
ture, the company's objective is singularly or predominantly to maximize
profits. Although preferred shareholders and debtholders do not have gov-
ernance rights per se, they may count on the governance rights of share-
holders-and directors' fiduciary obligations to them-to provide
protection for their investment. In a tranched L3C with a blended profit and
social mission, investors in preferred- or debt-like products may be made
wary by foundations' dominance of the governance process.
To know whether the L3C form will draw in significant new invest-
ment to blended enterprises, one must answer the empirical question re-
garding the size of investors' appetites for investments in them. There are
empirical questions as to the size of the frustrated PRI market, if any, and
whether the IRS will regulate to prop up the L3C form. In addition, for the
mezzanine tranche to be successful, the L3C must provide social investors
with a recognizable and trusted brand. Finally, a tranched membership L3C
must find a way to assure its targeted market-rate investors that their prom-
ised returns will be achieved when the entity is not being managed toward
an ultimate profit goal. Thus, L3Cs' ability to enhance funding for blended
enterprises is subject to many risks.
With its multiple funding stream approach, though, the L3C does per-
haps diversify some of these risks. It is also possible that the three funding
tranches could be pursued in turn, one at a time, rather than all at once at
the L3C's founding. Both social and market rate investors will likely be
more confident in investing in an established L3C than in an unknown
start-up. However, the L3C will not be able to offer the traditional carrot
social mission-based entities offer to suppliers of investment capital-tax-
exempt interest payments.
The CIC form seems likely to confront the greatest challenges in de-
veloping financing for blended enterprises. The CIC specifically targets
equity investors, but it offers them only a fairly radically altered version of
shares. Members of CICs limited by shares hold shares of the entity, but
these shares entitle their owners to receive midstream profits only-and
these profits remain capped. Shareowners are not entitled to residual profits
on the dissolution of a CIC. Indeed, the enabling statute specifically prohib-
its such residual distributions through the asset lock. A CIC may also util-
ize debt-like financing instruments, but these are subject to additional
regulation to ensure that they do not undermine the dividend cap and asset
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lock provisions. 190 In addition, CIC investors cannot be certain that their
interests will predominate the concerns of management. Instead, investors
must share governance rights, or at least access to the governance process,
with all manner of stakeholders that a CIC is required to include in its gov-
ernance structure.
This rigid financing structure seems to compound the various funding
concerns identified with respect to the L3C. Again, the CIC assumes a pool
of investors with an appetite for wedding financial and social return and
sufficient brand awareness and confidence to appeal to them. The CIC,
however, requires these investors to be especially devoted to the blended
enterprise concept by substantially limiting the upside of their investments.
Imagine a CIC that becomes spectacularly successful and could pay out
substantial profits to investors while still achieving a significant social im-
pact. The limits on distributing midstream profits and the prohibition on
distributing residual ones will prevent this CIC's investors from seeing any
greater return than would investors in a CIC making only sufficient profits
to declare the statutory maximum dividend. As the oldest of these young
forms of organization, some of these challenges to CIC's financing strate-
gies have already been the subject of criticism, documentation, and revi-
sion.19 1 The revised CIC dividend caps may better strike the necessary
balance; only time will tell.
The B corporation preserves the traditional attributes of equity owner-
ship virtually unscathed. Shareholders remain the ultimate owners, entitled
to the residual profits and assets of the corporation. These profits may be
provided to them during the B corporation's operations, via dividends, or at
dissolution through a liquidation or sale process. Like in any other corpora-
tion, the practical realities of the size of the entity and the dispersal of its
190. The Regulator of Community Interest Companies, Information and Guidance Notes § 7.3
(2008), http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/guidance/Chapter/202%20-
%200ctober%202009%20(version%203%2OFinal).pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2010).
191. As noted above, the recent CIC Regulator consultation sought input on whether current cap
levels may have frustrated CIC's ability to attract capital. See CONSULTATION ON THE DIVIDEND AND
INTEREST CAPS, supra note 125; see also David Ainsworth, Government urged to lift dividend and
interest caps on CICs, THIRD SECTOR,
http://www.thirdsector.co.uk/Channels/SocialEnterprise/Article/914804/Govemment-urged-lifi-
dividend-interest-caps-CICs/ (June 23, 2009) (reporting on the Charity Law Association's response to
the consultation urging CICs to be permitted to "distribute to 49 percent of their profits and have no
maximum dividend.., per share"). The responses demonstrated significant frustration with the divi-
dend caps, with financiers reporting they disincentivize investment, and non-CIC social enterprises
suggesting the caps were a reason they chose not to utilize the CIC form. See SUMMARY OF RESPONSES,
supra note 126, at 5-6. The Regulator's responded by changing the dividend cap to "20 percent of the
paid up value of a share." NOTICES UNDER THE COMPANIES (AUDIT, INVESTIGATIONS AND COMMUNITY
ENTERPRISE) ACT 2004, supra note 122, at 1.
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shareownership will determine the extent to which B corporation share-
holders may sell or otherwise transfer their shares. Legally, however, B
corporation investors' shares are freely transferable and liquid. B corpora-
tions also may use other standard corporate financing methods, including
debt and preferred shares, without restriction, but they seem unlikely to be
able to gain broad access to donations.
All of a B corporation's investors, however, must be willing-if not
eager-to invest their funds in an entity that will not pursue the funds'
growth as its predominant objective. Thus, whether the B corporation form
will increase the financing available for blended entities depends largely on
the success of its branding efforts and the size of the market for invest-
ments such as these. If there is a large amount of capital waiting for an
opportunity to invest in a blended enterprise, and they are aware of and
assured by the "B" brand, this model should draw increased investment. If
any of these key ingredients are missing, the promise of the B corporation's
funding stream is limited.
B. Enforcing Blended Missions
The question of enforcement relates importantly to those of financing
blended enterprise. As noted in the previous section, none of these forms
can achieve their financing goals without establishing a recognizable brand
that investors will view and trust as meaningfully distinct from business as
usual. They must offer some real and enforceable commitment to social
good. The L3C, CIC and B corporation forms each offer such commitment
methods to investors, the strength of which will ultimately determine the
success of their branding efforts.
Under the default rules, the blended mission of the L3C is essentially
unprotected. The L3C is directed to pursue a charitable or educational pur-
pose along with its profit objective. If the L3C at any time ceases to pursue
its social mission, though, the consequence is merely conversion into a for-
profit LLC. The invested and earned assets may remain within the former
L3C. Its membership need not change. Neither internal constituencies nor
an external regulator appear empowered to seek remedies against the for-
mer L3C or its management. So, at least as a default, an L3C's commit-
ment to blended enterprise seems enforceable only by internal consensus.
While the members invested in an L3C remain committed to its blended
mission, the L3C will follow that mission. When sufficient numbers be-
come disenchanted, the experiment with blended enterprise will quietly
end. This end might come through the existing membership expressing the
desire for a change toward profit objectives to the L3C's management, or
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by voting in new management. Alternatively, if the default LLC transfer
restrictions have been sufficiently altered, L3C members might sell their
interests to buyers seeking to transform its mission.
The tranched membership structure is one way L3C founders might
create their own enforcement architecture to safeguard their commitment to
blended enterprise.' 92 If the foundation funders in the equity tranche of an
L3C's funding structure have control over the board, they can be entrusted
not to put profit ahead of social good. As the last tranche entitled to payout,
and even that at the lowest rates, these foundation investors will have less
incentive to seize on profit goals. In addition, the limitations of the PRI
context (in which we assume foundations' L3C investments will be made)
prohibit foundation funders from allowing income generation or capital
appreciation to become a significant purpose. The IRS may operate as a
kind of shadow regulator here; as it monitors that PRIs are used properly,
its enforcement may overhang the entire L3C environment. Thus, if
adopted, the equity tranche control strategy seems fairly well-tailored to
enforce an L3C's social commitments.
Still, the equity tranche control strategy for enforcing L3C's social
conmmitments will not sufficiently enforce an L3C's business commitments
and the truly blended mission idea. If the equity tranche has effectively no
interest in profits, its control might well leave the L3C subject to the same
lack of rigor and efficiency that is sometimes said to characterize charity
management. Returning to the interplay between finance and enforcement,
to attract sufficient capital for the mezzanine and senior tranches, potential
investors will need to be convinced that the L3C structure provides an en-
forceable commitment to both profit and social good.
In contrast, the CIC form offers a high degree of structural enforce-
ment for blended objectives, along with enforcement rights conferred on
both internal constituencies and a dedicated external regulator. The major
features of the CIC-its community benefit requirement, asset lock, and
capped dividends-create a structural framework for balancing concerns of
profit and social good. The entity must commit in advance to its desired
social impact and its assets must be irretrievably dedicated to pursuing it.
Even if the entity is sold or dissolved, its assets must remain in the commu-
nity benefit or charitable stream. Yet, in the CIC limited by shares, the
form specifically contemplates an equity class that will hold governance
and profit-sharing rights. These rights, though, in turn are undercut by the
192. Lang Jr., supra note 24, at 4. The L3C's commitment to social goals could also be enhanced
by retaining or strengthening the default LLC restrictions on transfer of membership interests. Doing so,
however, would likely undermine the L3C's to access the capital markets to an unacceptable degree.
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required involvement of other stakeholders in governance and the cap on
dividends. These structural components will impede investors or outside
forces seeking to vary the social mission of a CIC. In addition, shareowners
in a CIC limited by shares might have standing to sue. It is possible this
power might be used by shareowners so inclined to compel company direc-
tors to hew to the CIC's blended mission. Perhaps the group of shareown-
ers invested in a CIC would be particularly likely to undertake such suits,
as they will be motivated by the combination of a desire for community
benefit and (albeit capped) investment gains. A CIC could perhaps further
empower other stakeholders with rights to sue, but they are not granted
such rights by the CIC statute, nor does the Regulator suggest such a role
would be fitting. 93
The CIC form, however, does not rely solely on internal enforcement.
Instead, it empowers a dedicated CIC Regulator to monitor CICs' compli-
ance with their mandates. In general, the Regulator oversees initial CIC
registration and receives annual reporting documents updating the Regula-
tor's office on a CIC's pursuit of community benefit and involvement of
stakeholders. The Regulator does, however, have additional powers to "in-
vestigate complaints" and "act if it is found that a CIC is not working in the
interest of the community or that the profit/asset lock is not being ob-
served." 194 Specifically, the Regulator may change the makeup of the board
or terminate the CIC.195 Rather than leaving CICs to internal and private
enforcement methods, this format envisions and funds a public backup
system, at least for enforcing social commitments. Like the L3C, this addi-
tional enforcement apparatus does not give any support to enforcement of
profit objectives. Perhaps its creators believe it unnecessary or are con-
vinced that the shareowners and the realities of the marketplace will create
sufficient incentives toward profit generation.
The B Corporation also employs weak structural enforcement mecha-
nisms, and it empowers both internal constituencies and an external regula-
tor. The structural components include the demands of the B Lab ratings
system and the required language for B corporation charters. The B Ratings
do not demand any specific commitments but rather give weight to a series
of commitments an applicant makes to combining its social and profit
goals. The initial certification offers a snapshot of how an enterprise is
fulfilling its blended mission at the time it receives a passing score from B
193. None of the guidance provided by the Regulator suggests empowering other stakeholders with
the right to sue.
194. CIC FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTION, supra note 94, at 12.
195. Id.
[Vol 85:2
BLENDED ENTERPRISE
Lab. The survey questions do not, however, generally require the applicant
to show an enforceable commitment to retaining those programs or prac-
tices that add up to a score entitling it to license the B mark. The charter
amendments suggest a somewhat stronger commitment. They require B
corporation directors to consider the impact of all of their business deci-
sions on the environment and society. Enshrining this obligation in the
corporation's charter goes some distance toward structuring the corporation
with blended objectives.
Neither of these components, however, is necessarily self-enforcing.
The B corporation form imposes no limits on transfer of ownership by in-
dividual investors, offers potentially limitless profit-sharing possibilities,
and does not lock any of the corporation's assets into the social enterprise
or charitable stream. A B corporation may revise its purposes away from
social and environmental goals and redeploy its assets for this use. To en-
sure that the profit objective does not overwhelm social ones, the B corpo-
ration form empowers individual investors to enforce the blended mission
through ordinary shareholder mechanisms. They may use their voting
rights or rights to sue to encourage directors to follow the charter's instruc-
tions, but will do so only if they have sufficient incentives.
Additionally, here, unlike in the CIC, if directors stray too far from
social mission in pursuit of profits, these profits may be shared with inves-
tors with few limits. Thus, there is the potential for shareholders to be co-
opted into a decision to consolidate mission around profit objectives. With-
out limitations on transfer of shares, these investors might also be bought
out by those willing to be so co-opted. The B form does not leave open the
possibility that other corporate constituencies will enforce such obligations.
The required charter amendments specifically and explicitly decline to
empower other stakeholders with standing to sue.
This is, perhaps, why the B corporation also establishes a means for
external enforcement by a private regulator: B Lab. Through the audit
process and licensing agreements, B Lab is able to revoke its brand from
companies that, over time, stray from the blended commitments that ini-
tially qualified them. It remains to be seen how seriously B Lab takes this
enforcement obligation. On the one hand, if it wants to build the value of
its brand, it must not allow "B" to become a marker for greenwashing or its
social good equivalent. It must enforce at some level in order to build
credibility with investors and other groups it desires its mark to impress.
On the other hand, in order for the "B" mark to do any of this, network
effects are also important. It must have enough licensed users of the brand
to make consumers aware of it, and if its demands are too stringent or too
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strictly enforced, it will offer the mark to too small a group to succeed. 196
Providing the optimal level of self-regulation in light of these two some-
times conflicting objectives is challenging. B Lab at the moment seems
quite dedicated to this task, but its ability to succeed remains to be seen.
III. CONCLUSION
To achieve their goals of broadening the scope and reach of blended
enterprise, hybrid forms of organization must both expand the financing
available to these entities and offer some means for enforcing their com-
mitments to blended missions. The L3C, CIC and B corporation each tackle
these questions, offering a menu of options to hybrid founders. All offer
something like equity financing. They also enable more and more flexible
forms of debt financing, similar to those utilized by for-profits. Each form
also offers some means to constrain hybrid organizations and their man-
agement from straying off the blended mission path--or at least from fo-
cusing too fully on profit-making. Each provides a method for constraining
these actions internally, usually through governance, though sometimes
through limitations on transfer of investments or assets. The CIC and B
corporation complement internal enforcement with external regulation and
monitoring, through a public or private regulator, respectively.
At this early moment in their development, it is too soon to diagnose
with certainty which, if any, of the extant hybrid forms will emerge as suc-
cessful and which will fall by the wayside. One pattern that does emerge,
however, is striking. The two invaluable contributions a hybrid form must
make-expanding financing options and providing enforceable commit-
ments to a blended mission-appear to trade off against each other. The
CIC form faces the most serious obstacles to enhancing financing, by virtue
of the dividend cap and asset lock limiting the gains investors may take
from the entity. Yet, the very same dividend cap and asset lock mecha-
nisms endow the CIC with the staunchest commitments to social good of
all the forms. 197 These strong structural enforcement mechanisms are then
further backstopped by the possibility of private enforcement by sharehold-
ers and public enforcement by the CIC Regulator.
196. See Mary Kay Gugerty & Aseem Prakash, Voluntary Regulation Of Ngos And Nonprofits: An
Introduction To The Club Framework at 56-57, in VOLUNTARY REGULATION OF NGOs AND
NONPROFITS: AN ACCOUNTABILITY CLUB FRAMEWORK (Gugerty & Prakash, eds. forthcoming Cam-
bridge University Press 2010).
197. The CIC Regulator has noted this dilemma already. See CONSULTATION ON THE DIVIDEND
AND INTEREST CAPS, supra note 125 (noting the Regulator's receipt of complaints about the restrictive-
ness of the dividend caps interfering with CIC's ability to obtain initial and growth funding, yet also
receiving compliments that the same appropriately protect community purpose).
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The B corporation, by its ability to provide an unrestricted upside to
investors, seems poised to access a greater share of the investment market.
However, a B corporation's commitment to blended enterprise may be
ephemeral. If its shareholders change their minds about pursuing social
benefit, or sell to those who would do so, the corporation's assets may be
redeployed for this new purpose without restriction. Of course, B Lab may
eventually unearth a B corporation's decision to stray from its blended
purposes and revoke the B mark, but this would appear to be the only po-
tential risk of such a strategy.
Even the tranched membership variant of the L3C form appears sub-
ject to this quandary. By tranching the funders, it attempts to appeal to
three different streams of funding: foundations seeking to place PRIs, so-
cially-responsible investors, and market-rate investors. Assuming there are
indeed foundation and socially-responsible investor markets sufficient to
capitalize L3Cs' equity and mezzanine tranches, this seems indeed poised
to unlock substantial new capital for social enterprise. However, for foun-
dations to make their PRIs, they need to be granted significant power to
control the L3C's fidelity to a social mission and the LLC's flexible gov-
ernance framework will enable it. The IRS' role monitoring foundations
will buttress this arrangement. But, this puts governance in the hands of an
entity perhaps over-committed to social goals, rather than blended ones.
Socially-responsible investors may or may not be willing to rely on founda-
tions' judgment to run blended enterprises. Market rate investors will likely
be even charier of relying on foundation-controlled boards to generate re-
turns sufficient to meet L3Cs' obligations to them. No external regulatory
mechanism has, as yet, been created to mediate these conflicting goals.
It is possible that the impasse cannot be breached, and instead the
creators of any hybrid model will simply have to choose a point at which
they are willing to trade access to capital for enforcement of blended mis-
sion. Perhaps the current vigorous experimentation in this field will one
day generate invaluable data on the optimal point to select, via a kind of
natural experiment. Or, perhaps, over time, private or public regulators like
B Lab and the CIC Regulator will be able to offer insights on how best to
set this balance. Until then, the L3C, CIC and B corporation models offer
founders of blended enterprises a range of possibilities to try to improve the
financing and enforcement of their dual goals.
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